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People tend to agree on the vital importance of peace, but there is no con-
sensus on what peace is and even less so on how it can be accomplished and 
secured. International peace-building strategies privilege a concept of peace 
that stems from Western experiences of a centralised democratic state. A 
global approach to peace needs to include the experiences of the Global 
South and to focus on reducing various forms of violence rather than simply 
ending war.
 • Peace is a complex process that is influenced by social, economic, and polit­
ical structures; a variety of actors; and a multitude of policies. Current post-
war societies reveal a high degree of variation regarding post-war violence and 
changes to the political system.
 • A global approach to peace is required in order to include the diverse cultural 
and historical experiences of all regions across the globe. There is no shortcut to 
or way to replicate the state-centred Western development path.
 • An interregional comparison of violence patterns suggests that conflicts are 
closely related to processes of social change at the intersection of increasing 
globalisation and local, salient cultural and historical trajectories. The analysis 
of these conflicts is thus the necessary starting point for peace­building strat­
egies.
 • Peace-building strategies must focus on violence reduction and non-violent 
conflict transformation. The termination of war is an essential first step but 
does not suffice. Although the specific arrangements to end collective violence 
are shaped by the incompatibilities and structures of conflicts, such agreements 
need to be open to future change.
Policy Implications
External support for peace processes by the German government, the European 
Union, or the United Nations needs to take seriously the claims and interests 
of various local constituencies and the fact that peace processes are a form of 
contentious politics. Promoting peace is not about following a single globalised 
template but rather about searching for common ground in order to end violence 
and non-violently transform conflicts. 
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Concepts of Peace
Peace is a complex concept and has a variety of definitions and indicators. A mini-
mum criterion is the absence of war – that is, organised political violence between 
at least two actors. The current war in Syria has produced more than 400,000 cas-
ualties and thus shows how important war termination is or can be for those af-
fected. However, concepts of peace must go beyond such a narrow understanding 
and take into account other forms of collective violence. Otherwise, countries not 
at war but with high levels of other forms of violence would formally be at peace. 
Ex amples are Myanmar, where the massive displacement of Rohingya is widely re-
garded as one-sided violence by government forces; Mexico, where organised vio-
lence by drug cartels is generally framed as criminal violence; and Burundi, which 
has seen more than 300,000 people flee since 2015 according to the United Nations 
High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).
Broader concepts of peace exist in other historical and cultural contexts (see 
Galtung 1981). Such concepts focus not only on reducing direct physical violence 
but also on enhancing people’s possibilities to fulfil their potential. Current peace­
building strategies adopt a sequential approach: they focus first on ending war and 
then on introducing reforms aimed at increasing participation. In Central America, 
for example, reforms targeting social and economic inequality were delegated to 
the political system and did not form part of the peace agreements although the 
marginalisation of large segments of the population was a main structural driver 
of the region’s civil wars. But with the end of war, peace was no longer a priority 
on the political agendas, which had turned towards “normal” problems. Post-war 
protests against the prevailing neoliberal policies were largely criminalised, and the 
problem of security and crime dominated the public discourse, demobilizing social 
protests and undermining democratic reforms. 
Even if we agree that peace is more than the absence of war or other manifesta-
tions of violence, the pathway to peace remains long, complicated, and non-linear. 
This became evident following the Cold War, when international peace-building 
strategies defined peace as the absence of external and internal war in politically 
democratic and market-oriented societies; this was known as the liberal peace-
building concept. It was based on the experiences of Western developed countries, 
state centred, and highly normative. There are very serious doubts about whether 
this can be reproduced in other world regions and whether it can be done in a short 
period of time. Achieving peace cost Europe many centuries and millions of victims. 
Today, Europe continues to witness many manifestations of violence (e.g. against 
women, migrants, and other marginalised groups), and it is far from certain that 
post–World War II peace is irreversible.
Experiences with the liberal peace-building suggest that there is no shortcut to 
peace using a Western template. In El Salvador and Guatemala in Central America, 
Mozambique and Angola in Southern Africa, and Cambodia and Timor Leste in 
Southeast Asia, the United Nations and other international actors supported liberal 
peace-building in the early 1990s. Although none of these countries has experi-
enced war recurrence, the data on violence and democratic reforms (state repres-
sion, homicide, political and civil rights, the political regime), show that they have 
only enjoyed mixed success with liberal peace-building (see Table 1).
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The data suggest that there is no obvious or linear relationship between violence 
indicators, the guarantee of civil and political rights, and political regime. For ex-
ample, despite being the most violent country, El Salvador also scores highest with 
regard to political transformation. Timor Leste, seemingly the most promising ex-
ample of liberal peace-building,  has experienced increasing levels of violence and 
authoritarianism according to reports. Meanwhile, Mozambique is seemingly in 
danger of witnessing 20 years of peace come to an end following the Mozambican 
National Resistance’s (RENAMO) 2013 decision to quit the peace agreement be-
cause it did not see any chance of a democratic change of power. The data illustrate 
the fact that there are no cohesive patterns of post-war development that are in 
keeping with the liberal peace-building paradigm. The following section presents 
a global approach [1] to peace that focuses on violence reduction and non-violent 
conflict transformation. Such an approach may help to overcome analytical Euro-
centrism and provide new insights for peace-building policies.
A Global Approach to Peace
Although made in the context of the Cold War, former German chancellor and No-
bel Peace laureate (1971) Willy Brandt’s quote that “Peace is not everything. But 
without peace, everything is nothing” is still relevant today given the broad consen-
sus on the vital importance of peace for development, economic growth, political 
participation, and social cohesion, among others. In a peaceful society it is not just 
the absence of war or collective armed conflict that matters; various other forms of 
direct physical violence also need to be reduced or eradicated. 
The first crucial element in the development of a global approach to peace is the 
proposition that the opposite of peace is not war but rather various forms of direct 
physical violence (Pearce 2016). Decisive for peace is thus the absence, reduction, 
and control of direct physical violence. This goes beyond the narrow understanding 
of peace but does not overstretch the concept by including the absence of structural 
and cultural forms of violence. At the same time, this concept of peace is not state 
centred and is therefore comparable across different world regions. Nevertheless, 
comparable data are a problem due to the controversial issue of framing, which 
is a result of fragmented research along disciplinary lines and the over-reporting, 
 under-reporting, or lack of statistics. Data on violence are highly disputed and 
many times part of the conflict. This is not just an academic problem; it also has 
serious repercussions for policies. Violence framed in the tradition of Clausewitz as 
“the continuation of politics by other means” has a certain level of legitimacy, while 
violence framed as “greed” and serving only personal enrichment lacks legitima-
Table 1 
Liberal Peace-Build-
ing Results
Source: Author’s com­
pilation based on Pol­
itical Terror Scale 2017, 
The World Bank 2017, 
Freedom House 2017, 
and Center for Systemic 
Peace 2014. 
Note: Green indicates 
the most peaceful or 
democratic values, while 
red indicates the least 
peaceful or democratic.
1 Peace-building is one 
of the very important policy 
fields for a truly global ap-
proach in social sciences 
based on the inclusion 
and work with alternative 
theoretical approaches and 
voices (Narlikar 2016).
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cy. Ending political violence can be discussed or negotiated by the relevant actors, 
whereas so-called criminal violence calls for law enforcement. However, boundaries 
are blurred and a clear-cut distinction is not possible. Actors can change their dis-
course, or the perception of actors can change. Many liberation movements such as 
the South African National Congress or the Vietcong were regarded as “terrorists” 
during the Cold War. Later, the legitimacy of their social, political, and economic 
claims was recognised, and most of these groups were accepted internationally. The 
question is thus who frames specific forms of violence as legitimate or illegitimate? 
At the same time, there is an increasing acknowledgement that different manifesta-
tions of violence are closely related (Davenport 2007).
A second vital element of a global approach to peace is the assumption that 
conflicts are a given in any society and that their non­violent transformation is a 
key condition for peace. The idea of transformation goes beyond the management 
or resolution of specific conflicts, including changes at the structural level (Mitchell 
2002). To develop a strategy that can tackle conflicts, it is necessary to examine 
global history to find evidence of violence reduction and peaceful coexistence as 
well as non­Western state­centric models of conflict transformation. A compara-
tive area studies approach that combines the context sensitivity of area expertise 
with disciplinary knowledge can contribute to both the generalisation and better 
specification of research findings (Acharya 2014). This does not disqualify universal 
norms and values regarding human rights. On the contrary, such an approach rec-
ognises and builds on the Global South’s contributions to many of the norm-gener-
ating processes regarding violence and human rights after World War II (Sikkink 
2014). These norms provide a shared frame of reference in a world increasingly 
interconnected via political, economic, and social globalisation.
Peace research has provided vast evidence that processes of change are conten-
tious and very much prone to conflict. However, we know little about the variations 
in change­related conflict across the globe. Social change affects the structures of 
society and provokes realignments of the relations and the distribution of power 
between central actors. In the twenty­first century growing interdependence and 
a multitude of (state and non­state) actors influence and shape these processes. A 
comparative frame for the analysis of peace and conflict transformation needs to 
start with the analysis of these conflicts and their specific expressions. The follow-
ing section will provide some empirical evidence on the major patterns of conflict 
and violence from a comparative area studies perspective.
A Comparative Analysis of Conflicts and Violence
Comparing the most recent data on conflicts unveils some interesting regional vari-
ations as well as multiple patterns of peace-building worldwide. [2] Regarding vio-
lence, we can see that armed conflicts are most common in sub­Saharan Africa, fol-
lowed by the Middle East and then Asia. State repression is most intense in South 
Asia, followed by the Middle East and North Africa and then sub-Saharan Africa. 
In terms of homicides, the Americas are the most violent, followed by sub-Saha-
ran Africa, where as Asia has the lowest homicide rate. However, when it comes to 
environmental conflicts, Latin America has the highest numbers. Regarding mass 
mobilisation the highest level of protester violence (2000–2014) is documented 
2 This is not a systematic 
evaluation of the data but 
an illustrative overview. 
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for Ivory Coast in Africa, Bangladesh in Asia, Turkey in the Middle East, Brazil in 
South America, and Greece in Europe. A systematic review of these (and, poten-
tially, other) data could provide evidence of regional and subregional patterns of 
conflict, violence, and peace­building opportunities. 
Nonetheless, the data also hide within-region variations. For example, the data 
on armed conflict in South East Asia for the period 1945–2016 are highly influenced 
by the violence in Myanmar, which accounts for nearly half of the conflict years; in 
the case of Latin America, the armed conflict data is highly biased by the violence 
in Colombia. 
The academic debate on collective violence focuses on two main incompati-
bilities: control of territory and government. Territorial control has historically 
triggered conflict and violence across the globe. The most prominent theories on 
state formation and war analyse this link (Tilly 1985; Toft 2014). Even in a world of 
sovereign states where borders are internationally guaranteed, this issue remains 
a topic of conflict – as evidenced by secessionist movements in Ukraine and Spain, 
for example. Government conflicts, on the other hand, are about political order and 
the legitimacy thereof. They involve various manifestations of violence with actors 
typically looking to overthrow the government, enforce participation, change the 
rules of the game, or secure power via repression (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010; 
Davenport 2007). Government conflicts have occurred across different regions in 
specific historical settings. During the second half of the twentieth century, nearly 
all Latin American armed conflicts were fought between guerrilla movements and 
authoritarian governments. Similar conflicts can be observed in sub­Saharan Africa 
and Asia, although the patterns of mobilisation differ there. 
During the last decade, non-state violence received a lot of attention due to 
the debate on the “new wars.” This category transcends the state­centric definition 
of war because the state is not directly part of the conflict. Here, non­state armed 
actors fight for control of territory, resources, and people. Although most armed 
actors are labelled “criminals” due to their lack of an explicit political agenda, such 
conflicts resemble early state­formation experiences, and such actors are similar to 
Tilly’s (1985) “stationary bandits.”
We also need to take into account that each region hosts a small number of 
countries with very few or no incidents of armed conflict and low levels of repres-
sion and homicide. Botswana, Uruguay, and Bhutan are exceptional in regard to 
violence. However, our knowledge of the relevant factors (i.e. actors, structures, 
and institutions) is rather limited. It is quite surprising that economic development 
seems to be of less importance than regime stability (Ansorg and Schultze 2014). 
The Institute for Economics & Peace (2017) attempts to measure peacefulness 
across the globe with its Positive Peace Index, which includes eight pillars: (1) high 
levels of human capital, (2) equitable distribution of resources, (3) well-functioning 
government, (4) low levels of corruption, (5) acceptance of the rights of others, (6) 
good relations with neighbours, (7) free flow of information, and (8) a sound busi-
ness environment. 
All of these are fundamental to the peaceful coexistence between and within 
soci eties. However, it is not possible to reverse engineer the findings of such stud-
ies in order to create roadmaps for action. Implementing peace-related policies is 
a contentious difficult process and could even produce violence. Policies related to 
resource distribution, well-functioning government, low levels of corruption, and 
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the acceptance of the rights of others also generate conflict and are difficult to im-
plement. Hence, it is essential to analyse the relevant conflicts, old and new. 
Despite variation in the specific dynamics and manifestations, all these conflict 
types are related to the broader processes of social change, which challenge exist-
ing patterns of territorial control and political order. Globalisation and the spread 
of capitalism link various cultural contexts and social change. However, specific 
interactions produce a variety of results. For example, patterns of mobilisation dif-
fer across time and space. In Europe interstate war and nationalism played a major 
role in state-formation and nation-building. In the Global South this process shows 
a broad range of outcomes: In Latin America nationalism was rare, and mobili-
sation was built on ideology, clientelism, or populism. In sub-Saharan Africa and 
the Middle East ethnic and religious patterns of mobilisation continue to play an 
important role. In East Asia and South Asia nationalism is more prevalent than in 
Southeast Asia, where ethnic and religious forms of mobilisation are more common. 
These patterns of mobilisation, as well as the related cultural and historical values 
and norms, not only play a key role in war and collective violence but also shape the 
nature of peace processes and the non­violent transformation of conflicts. Elite ac-
countability is important in all contexts but even more so where state repression or 
resource conflicts dominate. Recognition of indigenous or religious rights provides 
a basis for peace in regions that have experienced ethnic and religious mobilisa-
tion. Participation cannot be reduced to voting once in a while. Multiple forms of 
violence require multiple pluralist answers.
Peace-Building without Shortcuts
Current debates on peace-building strategies centre on the viability of the liberal 
peace paradigm, which views negotiated war terminations, comprehensive peace 
accords, and democratisation as the most important milestones. Critics of this ap-
proach highlight its emphasis of Eurocentric and state-centred models, a lack of lo-
cal ownership, and the production of hybrid institutions that may cause more prob-
lems than they help to solve. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on what does and 
does not promote violence reduction and increase participation is mostly incon-
clusive (see Table 1 above). A major shortcoming of the “liberal peace” approach is 
that it solely focuses on political participation (mostly elections), while increasing 
social and economic participation are delegated either to the political system or to 
development cooperation. In settings with high levels of corruption and clientelism 
this strategy is bound to fail (Haass and Ottmann 2017). Whereas reform causes 
instability, illiberal peace (which prioritises stability over change) contradicts many 
global human rights norms. At the same time, authoritarian structures may produce 
new conflicts, war recurrence, and/or other manifestations of violence. Post­war 
developments in Angola and Cambodia are evidence of the high levels of conflict 
and increasing state repression that can occur during authoritarian peace-building. 
A global approach to peace could enable us to circumvent normative debates 
and make it possible to bridge narrow and broad peace concepts. Global peace-
building strategies need to focus on the following elements:
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 • Reducing direct physical violence: Violence is the opposite of peace, and peace-
building strategies need to focus on reducing various forms of violence. Because 
controlling violence is a key challenge in maintaining social order, a global ap-
proach should look to combine traditional and new, formal and informal state 
and societal institutions in order to reduce the use of direct physical violence 
and facilitate non-violent forms of resistance. Existing justice systems and con-
text­specific ideas on justice need to be reconciled with global norms.
 • Promoting win­win solutions: Existing conflicts and their relations to the 
broader processes of social change need to be analysed and must constitute the 
main frame for peace­building strategies. A violent conflict between elites over 
political participation will require solutions different from those for a conflict 
between elites and marginalised groups over economic and social participation.
 • Ensuring peace-building strategies are open to future change: While it might be 
necessary to focus on accommodating armed elites to stop mass violence, this 
should not preclude adjustments or changes when they become feasible. Im-
punity after the end of war is a case in point. Few (state and non-state) armed-
groups leaders will agree to cease violence if they face long prison sentences. 
Nonetheless a minimum acknowledgement of past atrocities is necessary to sig-
nal that violent behaviour will not be tolerated. With time, it might be possible 
to find new pathways to reconciliation and recognition, such as truth­telling as 
a condition for amnesty or reduced punishment.
Policy Implications
A global approach to peace differs from a sequential liberal peace approach, which 
is based on a rather linear pattern of stopping mass violence first, stabilising sec-
ond, and transforming last. Recurring cycles of violence and the closing of spaces 
for participation show that we need more creative and comprehensive strategies. 
The ongoing peace process in Colombia reveals the many challenges involved in 
complex conflict settings. The peace agreement between the government and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) includes important provisions 
for conflict transformation, such as support for small­scale agricultural livelihoods. 
However, this remains a highly contentious issue for local and regional elites, who 
perceive these rather small reforms as a threat to their social and economic status. 
Instead of finding ways to make this a win­win situation, the resulting political po-
larisation has endangered the overall process. At the same time, a variety of violent 
actors are trying to capitalise on the lack of consensus regarding the scope of peace. 
Successfully implementing the peace accord requires (i) a quick peace dividend for 
the larger population, (ii) support for local peace constituencies monitoring the 
implementation of the agreement, and (iii) advocacy for a broader process of non-
violent conflict transformation. 
In general, internal and external peace-builders need a roadmap to guide them 
along the extensive and difficult path from collective mass violence to broader 
concepts of peace. Reducing violence, delivering a minimum level of justice to the 
victims, and redistributing economic and social resources need to be included in 
context­specific variation of any such roadmap. It might be necessary to promote a 
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somewhat narrow notion peace without losing sight of the requirements of a broad-
er concept of peace.
The World Bank and the United Nations’ new flagship report on violence preven-
tion (United Nations and World Bank forthcoming) and the German government’s 
guidelines on crisis prevention (The Federal Government 2017) are important steps 
in the right direction. They highlight the need to support changes at the structural 
and institutional levels and to strengthen and cooperate with reform-oriented ac-
tors. Inclusiveness is the new buzzword. However, the translation of these guide-
lines into concrete policies depends on the reform of the international economic 
and social order as well as on the willingness of actors on the ground. These are both 
highly contentious arenas. Past experiences with comprehensive peace agreements 
reveal the difficulties this entails. While many of these agreements include more or 
less detailed provisions for important reforms, implementation is mostly limited 
to immediate security provisions. Even where civil society has mobilised in favour 
of war termination, other priorities shape the everyday life afterwards. Therefore, 
local peace constituencies are needed to monitor agreements and advocate for non-
violent conflict transformation. In many post­war contexts change agents (e.g. so-
cial movement representatives, human rights advocates, or the independent media) 
are threatened or become victims of selective political violence. As international 
actors leave for the next theatre of acute crisis, local power relations take over. A 
profound non­violent conflict transformation can only occur if direct physical vio-
lence is penalised and delegitimised. This requires local and external actors to have 
long time perspectives and to clearly prioritise  peace across all policy fields.
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